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open-ended, even apophatic, discussions in the collection. A concluding
remark by Stump is fitting here. “The appropriate conclusion to any argument for a methodology ought to be the employment of it” (263). I look
forward to the work of analytic theology that is sure to be produced in the
future. Whatever may constitute analytic theology, and how successful it
can be, will be discovered only as the discipline is pursued.

The Soul Hypothesis: Investigations into the Existence of the Soul, ed. Mark
C. Baker and Stewart Goetz. New York: Continuum Books, 2011. Pp. 287.
$19.95 (paperback).
C. STEPHEN EVANS, Baylor University
The Soul Hypothesis contains a set of state-of-the-art papers in philosophy
of mind defending substance dualism. Although the book is an edited collection, unlike many such collections, it is tightly focused, and very well
organized. The essays complement each other very well, and later essays
refer to and build on points in earlier essays. Thus, in many ways the book
contains something approaching a sustained argument.
It is not quite a sustained argument for a single view, however. Although
all the authors are substance dualists of some kind, there are interesting
differences in the kinds of dualism they defend. Indeed, one of the major
theses of the book is that there are a range of positions that can usefully be
described as substance dualism. One can usefully categorize dualisms by
the degree to which they see the non-material soul as independent of the
body and the degree to which they see the soul as differing from the body
or other material objects. At one extreme, one might see Plato and (somewhat less extreme) Descartes, while at the other extreme one might place
two of the authors in this volume: William Hasker, with his well-known
“emergent dualism,” which holds that the mind is causally generated by
the brain but nevertheless is a distinct entity, and Robin Collins, who holds
a “dual-aspect” view of the soul, which attributes to it both physical and
non-physical properties.
Along the way, various authors present many standard, well-recognized
arguments for dualism (and critiques of materialism, which are often
closely linked), such as the “unity of consciousness” argument and arguments from the irreducibility of qualia. However, one of the interesting
features of this book is that several of the authors believe that empirical
and even scientific data are relevant to the arguments about dualism. They
try to show that dualism, contrary to the dismissive charges of materialists,
is not only fully compatible with recent scientific work, but actually may
be given support by scientific considerations. Along the way suggestions
are made as to how dualism could be tested, and how it could generate a
scientific research program.
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Charles Taliaferro’s “The Soul of the Matter” kicks things off with an exposition and critique of “eliminative materialists” such as Paul Churchland,
Stephen Stich, and Daniel Dennett (interpreted as holding to a view similar
to Churchland’s). Taliaferro argues that our first-person consciousness is
not simply a primitive theory, “folk-psychology,” destined to be replaced
by a third-person scientific theory. The truth is that without first-person
consciousness, no scientific theories can be developed or defended. (Many
of the essays in the volume focus more on “reductive” and “non-reductive”
forms of materialism; more attention to the kind of view Taliaferro criticizes would have been a plus.)
Daniel Robinson’s “Minds, Brains, and Brains in Vats” continues this
kind of philosophical argument. Robinson, who is an expert in brain science, tries to show that recent brain research does not undermine dualism.
To the contrary, the correlations between the brain and our mental life
have to be established by taking seriously the claims we make about the
latter. On Robinson’s view, much of the supposed empirical evidence for
materialism is not really evidence against dualism at all, but is the consequence of reading a materialist theory back into the evidence.
Mark Baker, whose own field is linguistics, looks at the issue of dualism
in relation to language-learning and linguistic competence in “Brains and
Souls; Grammar and Speaking.” Baker makes the argument that computers are not sensitive to meaning, but only to form—an argument similar
to one that John Searle has made famous. Baker goes on to suggest that if
the brain does function in ways similar to those of a computer, it may be
subject to similar limitations. Thus, on his view a dualist view of the self
may generate some interesting predictions as to what aspects of language
involve only the brain, and what aspects involve the soul (or perhaps the
soul and the brain).
Stewart Goetz’s “Making Things Happen: Souls in Action” tries to show
that only a dualistic view makes sense of our status as rational agents with
the power to make free choices. The main thrust of Goetz’s argument is
directed against the view that a “principle of causal closure” makes causation by a non-physical soul impossible. Dualism is entirely consistent with
neuroscience. However, Goetz, unlike some of the other authors (but perhaps like Taliaferro), does not seem to think that any particular empirical
considerations can establish the truth of dualism either.
Robin Collins, in “The Energy of the Soul,” provides a response to another
standard anti-dualist argument, rooted in the claim that dualism would
violate a well-established scientific principle, the principle of the “conservation of energy.” Collins argues that this objection presupposes an out-ofdate understanding of contemporary physics, since general relativity theory
implies that the total energy in some systems cannot be defined. Also, if
we look at contemporary quantum physics, it is not hard to see how there
might be causal interaction that does not require any exchange of energy.
Hans Halverson, in “The Measure of All Things: Quantum Mechanics and the Soul,” continues this look at the status of dualism in light of
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contemporary physical theory. In a difficult essay (hard because the science
is hard), Halverson explores some of the well-known paradoxes raised by
quantum theory, including the “entanglement” of distinct particles and the
“measurement problem,” which threatens to make observations impossible! Halverson explores various interpretations of quantum physics that
might resolve these problems, and argues that a dualistic view actually
might provide the best solution. Non-physical mental states cannot enter
a state of “superposition” with physical states, but this entails that there is
no “entanglement” and thus the “measurement problem” does not arise.
Dean Zimmerman, in “From Experience to Experiencer,” again tries to
show that scientific considerations, far from threatening dualism, actually
support dualism. He begins with an argument for property dualism, and
then tries to show that the materialist who recognizes mental properties
is stuck with extremely complex and implausible laws connecting these
properties with the body. The main reason this is so is that such physical objects as brains and central nervous systems are necessarily vague.
A dualistic view does not face the same problems since a non-physical
mind can have a precise identity. Non-reductive materialists who accept
emergent mental properties may thus be scientifically in a weaker position than dualists.
William Hasker, in “Souls Beastly and Human” gives a very clear summary and defense of the “emergent dualism” he defends at greater length
in his book The Emergent Self. Hasker begins with the discovery of a type
of polyp in the eighteenth century that can regenerate itself when cut in
half. Assuming the polyp has some kind of mental life (which is perhaps
dubious), this means that cutting the polyp in half also produces a new
soul. What Hasker really does is try to show that his kind of dualism does
justice both to the way the mind depends on the brain and the uniqueness
of the mind.
Robin Collins returns in “A Scientific Case for the Soul,” to develop and
defend the view that the postulation of the soul could be justified through
a scientific research program. Drawing on “superstring theory” Collins
presents a “dual aspect” view of the soul as having both physical and
non-physical properties. I found this essay intriguing, but I confess that
much of it, like a great deal of this book, put great demands on my own
understanding of contemporary physics.
In a revealing and illuminating “Afterword” the editors discuss the
relation between dualism and theism. They argue that the two are logically distinct; it is possible to be a theist and a materialist about humans
and also possible to be an atheist who is a dualist. They do acknowledge,
however, that theism and dualism make congenial partners and illustrate
how this might be so. The authors voice a suspicion that the contemporary
aversion to dualism is rooted more in an aversion to religion than to good
arguments or facts, and I share this suspicion. It is striking to compare the
understanding and subtlety with which these authors explore both materialism and dualism with the caricatures of dualism and unsophisticated
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arguments against dualism found in the writings of many materialists.
Let’s hope that these essays provoke some genuine dialogue and responses on the part of materialists.
I end with some mildly critical observations. The book is almost completely focused on contemporary issues and arguments. There is almost no
attention paid to the history of thought about these issues. Even Descartes’s
views are described in textbook fashion without much regard for historical
complexity. There is no attention given to medieval treatments of the soul.
This is not really a fair criticism; no book can do everything. However, I
suspect that attention to the historical Descartes might reveal that Descartes
was not, or not always, a “Cartesian.” In one key place Descartes argues
that soul and body are separable, even if they are actually not separate and
can only be separated by omnipotence.
I also would like to have seen some attention paid to the fundamental
issue of what is required to treat two things as distinct entities. Views
about such issues are assumed but not really discussed. I think it is not as
clear as many assume what it means to say that I and my body are distinct
entities. Most of the authors in this book seem to think of the soul as a postulated entity “in” the self. However, perhaps the soul just is the self, understood as a whole and not reducible to any physical object. I believe that
Christians in particular need to think more about what it means to say that
the self is embodied or incarnated. Perhaps it is true that I am essentially
a soul, and that a soul is not a physical object. However, I may be the kind
of soul whose nature it is to exist in a bodily form. If something like this is
right, then it is misleading to think of the soul as a separate entity existing
alongside the body. Rather I am a soul existing in a bodily manner.

The Believing Primate: Scientific, Philosophical, and Theological Reflections on
the Origin of Religion, ed. Jeffrey Schloss and Michael Murray. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009. Pp. 365. $59.95 (cloth).
E. J. LOWE, Durham University
This is an interesting and wide-ranging collection of new essays by psychologists, social and biological scientists, philosophers and theologians
on the currently much-debated issue of whether religious belief has an
evolutionary origin and, if so, whether that calls into question its truth
or rationality. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is not a complete meeting of
minds to be found in the volume, but at least the issue is discussed without the heat and acerbity that characterizes the semi-popular works of
some of the more prominent public figures with well-known views on the
topic. Some of the scientific contributors to the collection do tend to write
in terms that will strike the ears of many philosophers and theologians
as being unduly simplistic and reductive. But then, no doubt, to the ears

